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JOHN H. REAGAN: UNIONIST OR SECESSIONIST?
by Philip J. Avilla, Jr.
Studies of Texas ...ecession have concluded that Texans voted overwhelmingly in
favor of withdrawal from the Union in 1861. 1 Yet, students of Texas during the Civil War
era have also contended that strong signs of U nianis! sentiment existed in the state until
the very eve of secession.
For example, onc histmian has interpreted Sam Houston's strong victory in the
Texas gubernatorial election in 1859 as clear testimony of this Union sentiment and the
election of Andrew J. Hamilton to the United States House of Representatives from the
western Texas district in that same year has been similarly interpreted. John H. Reagan,
elected along with Hamilton to the House of Representatives, has also received
recognition as a true Unionist in ante-bellum Texas. 2

When Texas finally seceded, however, Houston's opposition proved less than
forceful, Hamilton served in the newly elected Texas legislature, and Reagan withdrew
from Congress before his state seceded. Where had all this U nianist fervor gone? A study
of John H. Reagan during the years 1857-1861 strongly suggests that, in one instance, this
Unionism never existed.
Born in Tennessee in 1818, Reagan epitomized the American ideal of the self-made
man. At the age of sixteen. although he remained in Tennessee, Reagan left home to seek
his fortune. For the next four years he supported himself through various jobs and pursued
an education in his spare time. In 1838 Reagan ventured to the newly created Republic of
Texas, where for the next several years he worked at different times as a surveyor, farmer,
and teacher. Dissatisfied with these occupations, Reagan began to study law in 1846, and
one year later plunged into politics.
In his first campaign. Reagan won a seat in the Texas House as a representative for
the eastern Texas district of Nacogdoches. Although defeated two years later in 1849
when he ran for the state Senate, Reagan had launched a public career which would last
until 1903 and include service as a United States Congressman, Postmaster-General of the
Confederate States of America, post-Civil War leader of the Democratic Party in Texas.
and Texa:-o's first Railroad Commissioner.
More important for the purposes of this study, during those first two year:-o in office
Reagan expressed his sentiments toward the national issues of slavery . slavery expansion,
and the rights of the South. For Reagan, they all went together. To challenge the existence
of slavery or to prohibit the expansion of this institution meant to violate the rights of the
South. In response to recent attacks upon slavery expansion, including the Wilmot
Proviso of 1846, Reagan drafted a resolution, subsequently adopted by the Texas
legislature, which defended territorial slavery as a constitutional right. A decade later,
while a member of the United States House of Representatives, Reagan used this same
constitutional argument to explain why he would follow the path of Southern secession. 3
Reagan's personal defense of his action has served as proof that he actually possessed
true Unionist feeling, his defection from the Union notwithstanding. In his Memoirs,
written in 1903, Reagan insisted that as a member of the House of Representatives in the
35th and 36th Congresses, he struggled to maintain the Union. 4 Many of his ante-bellum
contemporaries accepted this estimate and generally referred to him as a man of high
principle anxious to serve Texas and the United States. A memberofthc Texa:-o legislature
who later opposed secession. James W. Throckmorton, described Reagan as a man "who
Philip J. A villo, Jr., formerly Editorial Assistant qf Arizona And The West, now lires in
West Falmouth, MaH.
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will give proper warning when danger, from whatever quarter, either North or South,
threatens-who will keep us marching to the music of the Union. . instead of one who
would be throwing firebrands, and endeavoring to tear ... " the Union apart. The Dallas
Herald. a major Texas newspaper of the period, considered him a true patriot, "an able
defender of ... the Constitution and a Union loving statesman,. ." while the Tyler
Reporter viewed Reagan as an enemy of "the fire~eating disunionists. "5
Historians, too, have praised Reagan's attachment to the Union before and after
secession. Reagan's most recent biographer eulogized [he former Texas congressman and
insisted that Reagan "loved and cherished the Union and stood ready to fight her
battles."6 L1erna Friend also placed Reagan in the Unionist camp and believed that "he
and the Houston faction were agreed in devotion to the best interests of the country. "1
Even after Reagan had seceded, David M. Potter. in Lincoln and His Pa.rty, used Reagan
as an example of the widespread Unionism in the South which Potter felt verified his thesis
that ··voluntary reconstruction" was possible until the time of the Sumter crisis. s
Throughout his public career. before and after the Civil War, Reagan always
professed that he had directed his entire energies when in the Congress or at home in Texas
toward the preservation of the Union. His actions and his words immediately preceding
the Civil War. however, destroy this facade and portray the real John H. Reagan as a
secessionist.
For a complete understanding of Reagan's actions during his tenure in the House of
Representatives. two words, southerner and Unionist, require definition. In 1928. Ulrich
B. Phillips contended that in a diverse SOllth, a unity among whites based upon a
"common resolve indomitably maintained-that it shall be and remain a white man's
country" had always prevailed. This passion for white control raged so intensely that by
1850, the southern clamor for states' rights "had come to mean racial security,
self-determination by the whites whether in or Ollt of the Union .... " In a more recent
essay, HSlavery and Race," James McPherson has drawn the same conclusion as Phillips.
To be distinctively southern, then. meant to be dedicated to the principle of white
supremacy and the maintenance of a white dominated society in the South. u
In 1860, the term Unionist had ditTerent connotations throughout the United States.
For example, southern Unionists demanded that the Federal Government provide
protection for ·'southern rights," such as the expansion of slavery into the territories.
Only as long as the Union preserved these rights were Unionists in the South actually
willing to remain a part of the United States. 10 Phillips discovered many conditional
Unionists in the ostensibly Pro-Union, Constitutional Union Party. for many of its
southern members only supported a southern rights interpretation of the Constitution. l l
As long as southern rights, so aptly grouped by Phillips under the rubric white supremacy.
were secure. many southerners preferred the Union. So acted John H. Reagan. A
southerner first. he "remained devoted to the Union until the Republican Party obtained
control of the government" and the South appeared doomed. 12
As a freshman Congressman in the 35th Congress, 1857-IR59. Reagan initially moved
unobtrusively in the background. Not until controversy flared over the proposcd
Lecompton Constitution did Reagan offer his views of sectional controversy. The
Lecompton Constitution provided for the entrance of Kansas into the Union as a slave
statc and, in Reagan's view, would also have strengthened the national power of the
existing slave states. Infuriated by the Republican Party's opposition to the bill, Reagan
declared that party "destructive of constitutional liberty.
of the equality and
sovereignty of the states..
of the rights of the people, and revolutionary in its
character." In the same speech. Reagan advocated a southern convention to discuss
methods for protecting southern rights. Furthermore. he warned, if the Republicans from
the North continued to tmmple on the constitutional rights of the South, thc southern
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states would move ·'to preserve their rights, their honor, their equality, and their
independence, under a separate government.'· As early as 1858, the Texas Unionist had
revealed the conditional character of his national sympathies. 13
While northern Republican attitudes toward the slave states continued to anger
Reagan throughout 1858, growing dissension within his own Democratic Party began to
alarm him. Feanul that a disunited South would be unable to retain political control or
equity with the non-slaveholding states in the North, Reagan reasoned that party strife
endangered the entire structure of southern society. To avoid such a calamity, he urged his
fellow Democrats "to surrender their private judgments to the conventions of the party,"
to bury their differences for the greater cause uf southernism. 14
To make his own constituents more aware of the danger which confronted Texas and
the South, Reagan delivered numerous speeches throughout his district during the
summer of 1858. Once Reagan indicated that the immediate threat came from the radicals
within the Democratic Party. Men such as William L. Yancey of Alabama, who had
formed a "League of United Southerners," had disrupted the party machinery and
weakened the solidarity of the national Democracy. Why form splinter parties, Reagan
asked? "The Democratic Party, on its present principles. is the best Southern rights party,
and at the same time, the best Union party." Ironically, Reagan's opposition to radical
southern views, while designed only to protect the southern way of life, superficially cried
out, "the Union forever," and contributed greatly to the growth of the Reagan myth. l~
For the next year, Reagan unhesitatingly voiced his opposition to radical goals. He
opposed secession; he denounced renewal of the slave trade; and he objected to
filibustering, such as William Walker's expedition into Nicaragua. Although in October,
1~5~, Reagan insisted that he "still looked to the Union as the. . anchor of his hopes," a
few months later he seriously qualilled his position. Opposition to the slave trade and
filibustering, Reagan proclaimed in April, 1859, did not mean that he "opposed the
acquisition of any Southern Territory .... " Rather, he heartily approved of the
acquisition of other slave territory "both for the spread of our [southern] institutions and
forms and principle of government." Moreover, Reagan believed that such additional
territory "would strengthen the power of the slave states. . to resist the sectional
fanaticism which exists in the free states,"16
By this time, Reagan, in common with many southerners, had come to equate
"seclional fanaticism" in the North with abolitionism and abolition as the primary goal of
the Republican Parly. When discussing the causes of the Civil War in his Memoirs,
Reagan wrote that "in 1856, the antislavery men were organized into a sectional political
party."17 Two years before secession Reagan asserted that the control of the government
by this "revolutionary and fanatical party," void of any' 'respect for the constitution,"
justified secession. Should political power fall into Republican hands, the Congressman
urged '"the states to fall back on their own sovereignty, and to resist the power of
usurpation by every means necessary."18
Had the Republican Party actually been an abolition conspiracy, secession might
have been a logical response for a slaveholding South to make to a Republican victory.
Reagan, however, exaggerated the objectives of the Republican Party, and it was in this
distortion of reality that he resembled Southern radicals more than moderate Unionists.
Regrettably or not, devotion to slavery and "moderation" were fully reconcilable in 1860;
extremism consisted in seeing abolition designs where none existed. 19
In an analysis of Abraham Lincoln's political career, Richard Hofstadter wrote that in
the "Northwest, the seat of Lincoln's strength ... most of the white people ... were in
fact not only not abolitionists, but actually -and here is the core ofmatter-Negrophobes."
Lincoln recognized this and in a speech delivered in Peoria, Illinois, the future Presi-

26

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY

dent stated. "we want them l the Territories J for homes of free white people.' '20 Allan
Nevins concurred with Hofstadter's conclusion and wrote that after John Brown's
raid in 19j9 "the Republican Party was ... widely misidentified with the abolitionists."
Nevins also emphasized the northern desire to keep the Territories white as well as
free, claiming that "Indiana, Illinois, and even Kansas were unwilling to take a single
additional person of color. "21 Maintenance of a uni-racial society in the North. then,
not the containment of slavery or the abolition of slavery, was the real objective of
the Republican Party. In this respect, the North and South shared the same goal. The
South hoped to maintain white supremacy through the geographical expansion of slavery: the North, through the confinement of the NegT~} to the southern states. Along
with William L. Yancey, R. B. Rhett, and other secessionists, Reagan had confused
anti-Negro sentiment in the North with abolitionism, an objective far from the minds of
most Republicans.
Although Reagan continued to advocate secession, his southern contemporaries still
envisioned him as a "union loving statesman, who cares less for his personal advancement
than he does for the good of the country. "22 Others, Reagan complained, denounced his
opposition to the renewal of African slave trade and tillibustering. In his Memoirs, he
stated that he had not planned to seek another term in Congress in 1859. Adverse press
opinion, however, persuaded him to nm for re-election primarily to impress a "sound
political morality on the public mind. "2~ In spite of his adverseries and his own fears of
defeat, Reagan overwhelmed his opponent, states' rights advocate, Judge William B.
Ochiltree, by a vote of 23,977 to 3,464. 24 This campaign, considered a battle between a
southern Unionist and a southern radical, caught the attention of the rest of the nation. Tn
Washington, D.C., the Nationallntelligencer described the contest as "warm," due to
thc fact that Reagan had "incurred the resentment of a portion of his political
confederates" for his stand against the filibuster and the slave trade. For thelntelliRencer.
a Reagan victory could only mean the triumph of southern "moderation."2~
. If Reagan himselfbe1ieved that he "could scarcely hope to beat all the politicians and
all the newspapers, "26 and thel nlelligencer thought he had alienated himself from many of
his supporters, how did Reagan manage to win so easily? Many factors may have
contributed to the victory but none more than Reagan's political acumen. Early in the
campaign, Reagan emphasized the right of the South to secede if the "abolitionist"
Republicans received control of the government, simply reaffirming a belief shared by
most southerners. During this same period, the Dallas Herald announced that Reagan
supported slavery and the domestic slave trade, another view shared in common with his
constituents. 21 Even more enlightening than these factors is the Texas Democratic Party
platform for the year 1859. As Reagan explained in his Memoir.~, a resolution in support of
the controversial slave trade and filibustering failed to gain the support of the
convention. ~8 Although a few politicans and newspapers may have opposed him,
Reagan's platform deserted neither the Party line nor southern principles and virtually
guaranteed his re-election.
His election to the House won, Reagan still expressed his political sentiments toward
the Democratic Party and secession while at the same time condemning the split over the
slave trade and filibustering which threatened the foundations of the Party within the
South. Formation of a separate "Southern rights paTty on the one hand and a Union party
on the other, as contradistinguished from the Democratic Party," Reagan said, could only
bring about the fall of the Democracy at the hands of the "abolitionist" Republicans. That
event, Reagan reiterated, would end hope for the preservation of the "constitution ... or
the rights of the South in the Union. "29
As the summer of 1859 drew to a close, many persons interpreted the election results
in Texas as a sign of a rejuvenated national unity. The Nationall ntelligencer wrote that
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both the Republican and Democratic Parties appeared satisfied with the election of Sam
Houston as governor of Texas. Moreover, Texas had sent two "Unionists," Andrew
Hamilton and John H. Reagan to Congress. The combination ofthese three men in public
office seemingly brightened the cause for conciliation between North and South. 30
Concurrently with these ostensible moderate gains in the South, however, there also
appeared a strong movement in Texas for more radical representation in Washington.
Louis T. Wigfall, a known secessionist, received favorable endorsement for election to the
United States Senate seat, vacant because of J. P. Henderson's death. On August 31, the
Dallas Herald reported that Wigfall possessed all the necessary characteristics of an
admirable southerner. He had "defended the cherished principles of our party from
aspersions of her enemies, and elevated the standard of pure States Rights democracy."
On October 5. the same newspaper which had heartily endorsed the "moderate" Reagan
for the House of Representatives viewed the mounting support for Wigfall by other
newspapers as a "good omen, and as a sure sign that the clouds are leaving our political
horizon, and dissensions are healing. "31 In 1859, political dissension in Texas referred to a
rift in the State Democratic Party. Unity may have returned to the Texas Democracy. but
not necessarily Unionism. Wigfall, who advocated secession for the South in 1849, clearly
believed it even more appropriate in 1859.
Two weeks later, on October 16, 1859, a turning point in North-South relations
occurred. With a small band of men, the abolitionist John Brown raided the United States
arsenal at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. Though crushed almost immediately by Federal
troops, Brown's action sent waves of terror through the SouthY Reported in the Texas
press as an "abolition conspiracy, not a negro conspiracY,"H Brown's attack quickly
came to symbolized the revolutionary aims of the Republican Party.
In Texas, repercussions were almost immediate as the legislature hurriedly elected
Wigfall to the United States Senate, Texans rejoiced that the Democracy had finally
mended its fences and considered WigfaJrs election a "triumph. . that will do more to
unite the divisions and dissensions in the party than any event' '35 and thereby help save the
South. Thus, in the opening session ofthe 36th Congress, Wigfall, an avowed secessionist,
and Reagan, who had urged secession if northern abolitionists continued to threaten the
South, represented Texas, a state determined to express its sovereign power.
By this time, besides viewing all Republicans as abolitionists. Reagan also considered
them political opportunists. In their campaign speeches and public writings Reagan
discovered that they only discussed' 'the abstract right of man to personal liberty ." The
more practical, realistic question, one which Reagan deemed crucial to an understanding
of the South, the Negro's "fitness and capacity for civilization and self-government,"
failed to receive much Republican attention. 36 In the months ahead, Reagan hoped to
make the Congress more aware of this pertinent issue.
Accordingly, with two years congressional experience behind him, Reagan
confidently expressed his views on these subjects early in the first session of the 36th
Congress, In the midst of a near violent contest for the post of Speaker of the House,37
Reagan unleashed a vitriolic attack against the ·'abolitionist' Republican Party. He
labeled the party subversive, accused it of advocating violent revolution, and of plotting
the overthrow of the Constitution. His attack then continued with a defense of slavery.
Negroes belonged in slavery, they benefited from slavery, and they enjoyed slavery.
Negroes even loved their masters, Reagan stated, and if "an appeal were made to the
negroes to rise against their masters in the South,. . four-fifths of them would take up
arms for their masters and in defense of their homes."' Why, he wondered, did the
Republican Party wish to destroy such a well-structured society?3B
Reagan had little difficulty in transferring his animosity for the Republicans toward
their nominee for the Speaker of the House, John Sherman. This man, a representative
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from Ohio. had endorsed the Hinton Helper pamphlet, Impending Crisis of/he South:
How to Meet It, which Reagan asserted advocated the immediate abolition of slavery and
called for a general slave revolt. Sherman, Reagan concluded, had aligned himself with the
radical forces which supported such revolutionary acts as those committed by John
Brown. Reagan insisted that for the Union to survive, it must be a "Union under the
Constitution," the very Constitution which Sherman jeopardized with his actions and
words. Unless responsible men in the government decided to uphold the Constitution. to
willingly protect and recognize the rights of the southern states, Reagan warned. the
Union would soon crumble. 39
At the same time, Reagan professed his own intention to persist with efforts toward a
compromise solution and descnbed himself as a man who had consistently worked for
sectional accord. In the speakership Contest, for example. Reagan expressed his willingness to vote for any candidate, even an American Party member. 4 !1 Reagan's intense
anti-Republican feeling prevented a true compromise, however, for it caused Reagan to
vote against Sherman and to ignore the Republican representative's public opposition
"to any interference what ever by the people of the free States with the relations of
master and slave in the slave States."41 Had Reagan looked more closely, he might
have seen their basic agreement.
Pro-slavery sentiment, however, rather than anti~Republican feeling provided the
real insight into Reagan's actions. In another speech to the House, Reagan described
slavery as neither criminal nor immoral. "The real crime against reason and humanity,"
he concluded, would be to emancipate the Negroes. In a classic defense of slavery,
Reagan described "the four million negroes in bondage in this country ... better fed,
better clothed, better protected from violence and wrong. better informed. more
intelligent. " than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. To free the Negro would be to
destroy that ideal state. Besides, Reagan added, he found Negroes so incapable of
self-government and survival that if emancipated "they would fall into such. . idleness
and vice as would render it necessary for the security of society , to exterminate the greater
portion ofthe race. " How much better, Reagan insisted, to elevate the Negro to a Civilized
level while at the same time permitting the "white race to develop a great and splendid
civilization." With these words, Reagan removed the facade of his "Southern rights."
White supremacy remained his goal and reflected his real opposition to the abolition of
slavery.42
On this same occasion, Reagan chastised his Republican colleagues once more. this
time for their political hypocrisy. Did the northerners deny their claim to moral,
intellectual. and physical superiority over the Negro. Reagan asked? Surely, he declared.
northern politicians would "dare not acknowledge the Negro equal to themselves." Nor
did he' believe that they would consent to free southern Negroes "on the condition that
they should be sent to live in the free States. "43
While Reagan argued his case for States' rights and the necessity for slavery before
the House, pro~secessionist forces, outside the Congress gained strong momentum. As
early as January, 1860. for example, the Alabama State Democratic Party adopted a
platform asserting the right of an individual state to secede from the Union if the Federal
Government violated or failed to protect its constitutional rights, rights which included the
ability to carry slaves into all federal territories. 44
At the same time, the Texas Democratic Party machinery formulated its own highly
racial. pro· slavery , pro~secessionist platform for the election of 1860. Like Reagan, the
party members who attended the convention also assumed that the Republican Party
strove to emancipate the Negro, condemned this northern infringement of southern rights,
and reiterated the South's privilege to secede. 45
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Besides drafting this party platform, the State Convention, which had met in early
April, 1860, chose delegates for the Democratic National Convention scheduled for later
that month in Charleston, South Carolina. Composed of ;'staunch champions of the
slaveholders cau~e,"46 the:-oe men agreed to vote as a unit at the convention. Should the
Party gathering fail to adopt their demands for a strong states' rights platform before the

selection of a presidential candidate. the Texas delegation agreed to bolt the
proceedings. 47
As many southerners had expected, the National Convention failed to adopt the
strong states' rights platform of the Alabama Democracy. Consequently, secessionist
(fire-eating) delegates wasted little time. With the Alabama deputies in the lead,
delegations from six other states, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina,
Arkansas, and Texas, left the convention. Unable to accomplish anything further, the
remaining delegates adjourned on May 1 to reconvene in June in Baltimore. At this second
meeting, the Party split once again. By the end of June, factious elements of the
Democratic Party in Baltimore had nominated two candidates for Presidentofthe United
States, Stephen Douglas and John C. Breckinridge. The newly formed Constitutional
Union Party selected still another candidate, John Bell, while in Chicago, on May 18, the
Republicans chose Abraham Lincoln to carry their standard. 48
As the election of 1860 approached, many Texans shared Wigfall's view that a
Breckinridge victory appeared as "the last and only hope for the safety of the South, or the
Union."49 In major towns and cities of Texas, extremely radical secession groups,
organized by the Knights of the Golden Circle. formed and actively planned for secession
should Breckinridge lose the election, a predictable outcome. GO The Dallas Herald, which
also supported Breckinridge, wrote that to accept another man as President meant to
surrender the rights of the South and its people to northern abolitionists ..~l
Reagan, too, reacted to the pressures which surrounded the coming election.
Although he continued to describe himself as an advocate of compromise, Reagan's
actions and words, as in the past, indicated otherwise. In an open letter to the
Congressman, Judge George W. Paschal, leader of the Union Party in Texas, asked
Reagan if he though Lincoln's election would provide enough cause for secession or at
least resistance to his inauguration. Reagan replied that he .. still clung to every reaMmable
hope for the Union," but in the same letter advocated resistance if Lincoln won the
election "by the best and most effective means which can be adopted by the states."
Should they fail to secure a guarantee for slavery within the Union and its territories, then
Reagan recommended secession. 52 A week before the Presidential election. Reagan privately expressed his fear of a Lincoln victory, advocatins in the event ofsuch a catastrophe
separation from the Union as quickly as possible.G 3 By December, moreover, Reagan's
secessionist aims had intensified so greatly that his Congressional colleague from Alabama,
David Clopton, considered him among "the most advanced" who sought secession. (;4
The split in the national Democratic ranks had little effect on the outcome of the
election. Had either of the three candidates opposed to Lincoln, Douglas, Breckinridge,
or Bell, captured all the states which Lincoln lost, their electoral vote would have still
remained below the needed majority. Knowledge of who supported the losing candidates
and what each one represented, however, can provide valuable insight into the real
meaning of the election. Douglas, a Union man, and a northerner, opposed secession on
any grounds. Bell, the Constitutional Unionist. received much of his support from
southerners labeled "co-operationists" by Dwight Dumond, themselves states' rights
men but at least not ardently secessionist. Breckinridge, on the other hand, had received
his nomination from secessionist elements within the Democratic Party. 55
In Texas, only two of these candidates, Breckinridge and Bell, appeared on the ballol.
Reagan, who throughout his political career had professed his loyalty to party and
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country, supported the candidate of the secessionists, Brcckinridge. 56 The Texas
gubernatorial contest of 1859 had confronted Reagan with a similar issue. In that year, the
Texas Democratic Party nominated an ardent secessionist, H. R. Runnels, for governor
to oppose the Unionist candidate, Sam Houston. Although Reagan's biographer has noted
that Reagan never actually supported Runnels, when forced lo decide between "party
loyalty . . and the maintenance of his convictions," he chose party. 57 In reality.
however. Reagan followed the dictates of his conscience in both cases. In 1859, he
endorsed a pal1y platform dedicated to the protection of southern rights; in 1860, he
endorsed Breckinridge, a man whu campaigned on a similar platform and who, Reagan
believed. possessed the power to protect slavery in the South.
By January 15, 1861, hope for a settlement between the North and the South within
the Union had faded from Reagan's public pronouncements. In a speech on the t1oorofthe
House, the Texas congressman warned his Republican colleagues that as a result of their
failure to compromise, few southern states, if any, would remain in the Union after
Lincoln's inauguration on :\-larch 4. Again he asserted that bondage provided the best
possible life for the inferior blacks and urged the Republicans to consider the
consequences of abolition. Would northerners, he asked. "accept negroes as freemen and
citizens" in their states? A raucous. "No! No!," reverberated through the chamber as
Reagan proceeded, "yet you demand of us to liberate them ... to dissolve society and to
break up social order. to ruin our commercial and political prospects for the future, and
still to retain such an element among us." Past successes of their government had reSUlted.
he reminded the House, because "none but the white race, who were capable of
self-government. were enfranchised with the rights of freemen." The thought of Negro
equality with the white race revolted Reagan. Such equality, he said. could only signal the
death knell for the entire nation. 5~
Even in the midst ofthis speech, his final message to the House. Reagan attempted to
emphasize his past loyalty to the Union. The Union, he believed. still offered opportunity
for southern society provided the "radical" Republicans abandoned their plot to destroy
the South ..~9 Although Reagan convinced his Texas contemporaries and most twentieth
century students of Texas history of his Unionist stance. at least one of his Congressional
colleagues, Republican representative Benjamin Stanton of Ohio. thought otherwise. In
answer to Reagan's attack, Stanton charged Reagan with basing "his whole argument upon
the idea that the Republican Party is seeking to interfere with the subject of slavery in the
slaveholding states of this Union." This notion waf> absurd, Stanton claimed. stating that
he knew of
no Republican who looks to the Republican organization as an organization
designed. either directly 0"1' indirectly. now or in the future. presently or
remotely, to intertere in the remotest degree with slavery in the states.
Puzzled that a man as "well-informed as the gentleman from Texas" equated
Republicanism and abolitionism. Stanton urged Reagan and the South to reject such
"existing delusions" and to work for national harmony. 60 Reagan. however, had closed
his eyes to the truth as early as 1856. During his four years in Congress Reagan's words
and actions. only "moderately" less shrill than the most ardent fire-eater's. had shown
him more willing to secede than to understand.
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